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Would it please the ''Canadiens'' that the English law of [[Wikipedia:Habeas Corpus|Habeas Corpus]] be solemnly introduced, by an Act of Parliament, in Canada; so that the power to put men in prison, be exerted only by written orders signed by the magistrate who gives them, and in which would be expressed the cause of the imprisonment; and that the judges of the province be given the right to examine the causes expressed in these orders, and, if they were not legitimate grounds to imprison a man according to existing laws of the province, to liberate the people, wrongfully held captive, in their prisons, either without any condition, and with or without bail, according to whether the laws would require it; and that all this procedure be application as much for the people who would be imprisoned by the order of the governor, or the King himself, as for those who would be imprisoned by any other person?
'''Secondly''', -- Would it please the ''Canadiens'' that be restored, in the courts of justice of the province, the right to have [[Wikipedia:juror|jurors]] decide the facts that would be disputed between the litigating parties in civil matters, if the parties, or one of them required it, as it was in the province from September 1764, up until May first, 1775, when the [[Wikipedia:Quebec Act|Act of the Parliament of the year 1774]], for the establishment of the government of this province, began to take force? -- And, if jurors were restored in civil matters, would be it please the ''Canadiens'', that while giving their reports, or verdicts, on the matters submitted to their decision, one required that they be, all twelve, unanimous, or rather than they claim to be so; or would it be more pleasant to the ''Canadiens'' than the decision of nine jurors, who would agree, out of the twelve, be considered sufficient to decide the matter in question according to their feeling, in spite of the opposition of the others three jurors? -- And, moreover, would it be pleasant to the ''Canadiens'' that jurors be paid by the litigating parties, or by the party which would require it, a moderate sum, like one [[Wikipedia:Piastre|Spanish piastre]] each, or half a piastre, to reward them for the time and attention which they would be obliged to give to these decisions?
'''Thirdly''', -- Would it please the ''Canadiens'', that, in order to have the members of the legislative Council of the province act with more liberty and zeal for the good of the province, and to make them more respectable to the eyes of the other inhabitants of the province, it be ordered in the least ambiguous and most solemn way, by an act of the Parliament, that the governor does not have the power to dismiss any member of that council from his office of adviser, or even to suspend any member for a time, however short it may be, without the assent of four fifth of the members of the council, i.e. if they were twenty advisers, then sixteen among these twenties; and, in all cases, if the advisers were less than the number of fifteen, without the assent of at least twelve advisers; which assent from the advisers who would join the governor in suspending one of their fellow-members, would be signed of their hand on the registers of the council, and also on another copy that would be given to the suspended person. Always provided that the King Himself preserved the power to dismiss such adviser that he would like, when it would seem good to Him, or by an act made in His private council, or by an order signed by His hand, and contresigned by the Secretary of State.
'''Fourthly''', -- Would it please the ''Canadiens'', that, to render the judges of the province more courageous in administering justice with impartiality, it be ordered by an act of Parliament, that none of them be removable of his office of judge by the governor of the province, under whatever pretext it may be; and also that the governor should not have the power to suspend any one of them for more than a year, nor for this amount time, or any amount time, whatever short it may be, without the assent of at least twelve members of the legislative council of the province, signed by their hands on the registers of the council, and also on another copy which would be given to the suspended judge: Always provided that the King Himself keep the power to dismiss any judge He would like, when it would seem good to Him, or by an act made in His private council, or by an order signed by His hand, and contresigned by the Secretary of State.
'''Fifthly''', -- Would it please the ''Canadiens'', that it be declared by an act of Parliament,that the governor of the province could never imprison any person in the province, whatever the cause; not even for the most atrocious and most attested crimes: but what the duty to imprison the people who would have offended the law, and would deserve to be put in prison, belonged only to the criminal judges, and to justices of the peace, or in general to the magistrates of criminal justice? -- This law is in force in England; because the King of England does not have the right to imprison any person in England by His own order, for whatever crime it may be; not even for the crime of [[lese-majesty]], or rebellion, which would be attested by the oath of ten eyewitnesses, or for an assassination which would be attested in the same way: but, if one gave Him information of such crimes, He would be obliged to transfer the matter to His Chief Justice of the Kings's Bench, (which is the higher court of criminal justice in England) or to some Justice of the Peace, or some other magistrate of criminal justice; who, after obtaining the necessary information, would send the accused person in prison, so that his lawsuit be made, in a suitable and legitimate time and place, and, if it were found guilty by a body of jurors, that he be punished, either by death, or some other punishment which the law would have attached to the crime. By this fortunate impotence, where the law of England puts the King, to imprison whoever, for whatever reason, by His own order, two great disadvantages are avoided; to know, firstly, despotism, or absolute capacity to remove freedom on the subjects of the crown without cause, and with the simple liking of the king; and, in the second place, the personal disgrace of the king, who would result from the cassation of his kinds, like illegal and insufficient, by lower magistrates: because, if the king could give orders to imprison his subjects, one would need of two things one; or the order would validate in all cases, and would not be breakable by the authority of any other person; or it would not be valid in all cases, but only if the king would have given it for a legitimate ground, and on sufficient information; and in this last assumption, it would be necessary that some lower magistrate had the right to examine whether the ground were legitimate or not, and if information were sufficient or not, and to break the order of the king if the ground were not to be legitimate, or information not to be not sufficient. In the first assumption, the king would be the absolute Master of the freedom of all his subjects; and in the second, the personal character of the king for justice and wisdom could suffer from disgrace, by the cassation of the orders which it itself would have given and signed: what would be also a great evil for the kingdom, as well as for the king, though less than the horrible despotism which would result from the first assumption. To avoid these disadvantages, the king never puts any person in prison by his own order; and it seems that it would be reasonable to declare by an act of the Parliament, that the governor of the province of Quebec will not be able pareillement to make imprison any person in this province by his own order.
''...savoir, premièrement, le despotisme, ou le pouvoir absolu d'ôter la liberté aux sujets de la couronne sans cause, et au simple gré du roi; et, secondement, la disgrâce personnelle du roi, qui résulterait de la cassation de ses ordres, comme illégaux et insuffisants, par des magistrats inférieurs: car, si le roi pouvait donner des ordres pour emprisonner ses sujets, il faudrait de deux choses l'une; ou bien l'ordre validerait en tous cas, et ne serait point cassable par l'autorité d'aucune autre personne; ou il ne serait point valide en tous cas, mais seulement dans le cas où le roi l'aurait donné pour une cause légitime, et sur des informations suffisantes; et dans cette dernière supposition, il faudrait que quelque magistrat inférieur eût le droit d'examiner si la cause était légitime ou non, et si les informations étaient suffisantes ou non, et de casser l'ordre du roi si la cause ne se trouvait pas être légitime, ou les informations n'être point suffisantes. Dans la première supposition, le roi serait le maître absolu de la liberté de tous ses sujets; et dans la seconde, le caractère personnel du roi pour la justice et la sagesse pourrait souffrir de disgrâce, par la cassation des ordres qu'il aurait lui-même donnés et signés: ce qui serait aussi un grand mal pour le royaume, aussi bien que pour le roi, quoique moindre que le despotisme horrible qui résulterait de la première supposition. Pour éviter ces inconvénients, le roi ne met jamais aucune personne en prison par son propre ordre; et il semble qu'il serait raisonnable de déclarer par un acte du parlement, que le gouverneur de la province de Québec ne pourra pareillement faire emprisonner aucune personne en cette province par son propre ordre.''


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