Québec-Canada: A New Deal. The Québec Government Proposal for a New Partnership Between Equals: Sovereignty-Association

From Independence of Québec - Resource Centre for the English-Speaking World

Contents 1 The Future of a People 2 Chapter One. "Lest We Forget" 2.1 Roots 2.2 The Will to Survive 2.3 The Will to Fight 2.4 The Act of Union of 1840 2.5 The 1867 Federation 2.6 A Confederation in Name only 2.7 A Province like the Others 2.8 Francophones as a Minority 3 Chapter Two. Quebec's Experience of Federalism 3.1 Provincial Autonomy and Federalism 3.2 The Centralizing Thrust 3.3 The Causes of Centralization 3.4 Ottawa's Interventionism 3.5 Invasion of Social Policy 3.6 Invasion of Labour Relations 3.7 Invasion of Municipal Affairs 3.8 Natural Resources 3.9 Other Areas 3.10 Invasion of Culture 3.11 A Dilemma 3.12 Federal-Provincial Overlapping 3.13 Meetings, Committees, Conferences 3.14 Poorly Adapted Economic Policy 3.15 Transportation 3.16 Location of Industry 3.17 Agriculture 3.18 An Urgent Need for Action 4 Chapter Three. Federalism: an Impasse 4.1 The Depression and Centralization 4.2 The Post-War Period 4.3 The Laurendeau-Dunton Commission 4.4 Revision of the Constitution, 1968-1971 4.5 The Pepin-Robarts Task Force 4.6 The Final Efforts 4.7 Deadlock 4.8 The Logic of the System 4.9 Special Status: an Illusion 4.10 The Impossibility of Renewal 4.11 A Conclusion 5 Chapter Four. A New Deal 5.1 The Way of the Future 5.2 The Modern Phenomenon of Association 5.3 Modern Associations of Sovereign States 5.4 The Implications of Sovereignty 5.5 Types of Association 5.6 Forms of Association 5.7 The Special Character of the Québec-Canada Relationship 5.8 The Proposal 5.9 A. Sovereignty 5.10 B. Association 5.11 Areas of Common Action 5.12 Areas of Mutual Understanding 5.13 C. Community Institutions 5.14 The Legal Equality of the Partners 5.15 A Proposed Plan 5.16 A Community Parliament? 5.17 Sovereignty-Association: a Means 6 Chapter Five. The Referendum 6.1 A. The Implications of the Referendum 6.2 The Need to Negotiate 6.3 Quebec-Canada Interdependence 6.4 The Risks of a NO Answer 6.5 B. The Referendum Mandate 6.6 Quebec-Canada Negotiations 6.7 The Process 6.8 (a) Reflection 6.9 (b) Referendum 6.10 (c) Negotiation 6.11 (d) Implementation 6.12 Acquired Rights 6.13 It will Take Time 7 Chapter Six. Quebec, Land of the Future 7.1 A Young, Competent, Educated Nation 7.2 Abundant Natural Resources 7.3 A Major Asset: Hydroelectric Energy 7.4 The Instruments of our Growth 7.5 A Prosperous Economy 7.6 Our Social Progress 7.7 The Development of Our Culture 7.8 Respect for Freedoms and Cultural Diversity 7.9 Opening to the World 7.10 Defence 7.11 Cooperation 7.12 The Will to Progress 8 A Call to the Quebec People 9 Notes

The Future of a People

There are crucial moments in the history of peoples as there are in the lives of individuals.

Nothing is more natural.

To live is indeed to choose, and there is no progress without movement, effort, change. To progress one must move ahead and successfully meet the challenges of time.

Such crucial moments are rare. And perhaps it is better that way, since a certain amount of anguish is an inevitable concomitant. Even when the new path that opens at the crossroads is more promising than the old, we instinctively tend to exaggerate the pitfalls. And naturally, fear of change lends an unwonted attraction to the old road where there was no horizon.

Fear must be overcome to achieve success.

Here we all are, men and women of Quebec of whatever origin, at a crucial moment, a crossroads. After years of debate, constitutional "crises", inquiries and reports, the time has come to choose, freely and democratically, the path for our future.

A historic rendezvous, next spring, will give us that opportunity.

When the time comes to direct and commit its common destiny, a people must act only after mature reflection.

Quebecers, where do we come from, where are we now, and what are our chances of growth and fulfillment? Those are the questions a citizen must ask to make an enlightened decision, and the Government of Quebec wants to help answer them by explaining its option as clearly as possible.

For the Government of Quebec has reached the conclusion that our development as a people requires the transformation of today's federalism into an association in which Quebec, as part of an economic and monetary union, would have all the powers of a sovereign country, just like Canada. This new deal, between equals, is the only path leading from our past, through the demands of the present, toward a future which belongs to us.

Chapter One. "Lest We Forget"

Peoples, like individuals, have their own specific characteristics and evolve under specific conditions; that is why they do not all achieve control of their own destiny through identical means. But history shows that though the steps taken may vary, they all come as a result of a community awareness, a determination to be faithful, a desire to be open to the rest of the world.

A study of our past will show that the path taken by Quebecers, no matter how original it is, follows the same laws that have prevailed through the ages as various peoples have assumed national sovereignty.

Roots

Our ancestors put down their roots in American soil at the beginning of the 17th Century, at the time the first British settlers were landing on the east coast of what would become the United States. As they were clearing the land of the St. Lawrence Valley, they explored the vast continent in all directions, from the Atlantic to the Rocky Mountains, and from Hudson Bay to the Gulf of Mexico. Through discovering, claiming and occupying the land, Quebecers began to look on themselves as North Americans.

By 1760, our community was already an established society along the shores of the St. Lawrence. North American by geography, French by culture, language and politics, this society had a soul, a lifestyle, a way of behaving, traditions, institutions that were its very own. Its struggles, its successes and the ordeals it endured had made it aware of its common destiny, and it was already impatient under the colonial ties.

The Will to Survive

Sooner or later, that society would have rid itself of the colonial yoke and acquired its independence, as was the case in 1776 for the United States of America. But in 1763 the hazards of war placed it under British control. Deprived of their leaders, many of whom had to go back to France, subject to new masters who spoke another language, kept out of the civil service by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, our ancestors, lacking influence and capital, and ruled by British law, saw the entire commercial and industrial structure they had built pass gradually into the hands of English merchants.

Faced with this defeat, Francophones spontaneously chose to be faithful. There could be no question of passing over to the winners' camp to reap the benefits that awaited them. They would adapt to the new situation, come to terms with the new masters, but above all they would preserve the essential elements that characterized our people- its language, its customs, its religion. They would survive, no matter what the cost.

The Will to Fight

As early as 1763, our ancestors, anxious to assert themselves, decided to resist. What if government, the civil service, trade and industry were closed to them? They retreated to the territory that was left to them: the villages, the land, the forests. There at least values could be preserved, the fabric of their communal-life reinforced, through the family, the parish, the school and local administrative bodies.

Helped by circumstances, they won their first political victory. In 1774, the Quebec Act made it possible for them to live in French and be governed by French civil law. Though it was partly because the British hoped to find in our people an ally against the rebel American colonies, this victory was nonetheless a vitally important one, since it both re-established historical continuity and laid the indispensable foundation for all future progress.

Over the years, our ancestors set down another, equally important, foundation for their future. They made good the numbers they lacked in 1760. From 60 000 at that time, their numbers increased to 120 000 by about 1785, 240 000 by about 1810 and 500 000 by about 1835. The population doubled every 25 years. Alongside the new Political structures that were being set up, in the rural areas a real country was being reshaped.

Following the American Revolution, British settlers began flocking in. They settled mainly in the Eastern Townships, and along the St. Lawrence from Montreal west to the Great Lakes where they gradually became a majority. Soon they demanded political institutions that would not make them subject to laws inspired by those of France, institutions in which they would recognize themselves culturally. Giving into their pressures, London decided in 1791 to divide the province into Lower Canada and Upper Canada, thus amputating from the Quebec territory the whole of the Great Lakes region today the richest part of Ontario-which became Upper Canada. Each province had its own Legislative Assembly and for the first time in its history our people could elect their own representatives.

The Parliament of Lower Canada, where the language used was French, proposed laws and a budget that were submitted for approval to the Governor, who exercised executive power on behalf of the London authorities. The people's will was often blocked by the Governor's veto, since the Governor was particularly sensitive to the interests of the English minority in Lower Canada and to those of the Imperial power. By 1830 the tense situation was nearing a crisis. The elected representatives drew up a list of resolutions in which they expressed their demands: control by the Assembly of taxes and spending as well as implementation of urgently needed economic and social measures. The Governor refused and dissolved the Assembly. In the elections that followed, the Patriotes, headed by Papineau, won 77 seats out of 88 with more than 90% of the vote. Presented with the same demands, the Governor responded by dissolving the Assembly once again.

It was a total stalemate. Though some political leaders and the inhabitants of some villages saw no other solution than resistance, the British themselves were exasperated and some hoped for armed confrontation, fearing they might "fall under the rule of a French republic". Governor Gosford put a price on the heads of the leaders of the Patriotes, and troops were sent out to capture Papineau and his lieutenants. The Patriotes' victory at St. Denis was their first and their last: they were crushed at St. Charles and St. Eustache. The repression was cruel: hundreds of Patriotes were jailed, and twelve were hanged; many farms were burned to the ground. The 1837 rebellion and its immediate consequences affected the Quebec people deeply and had a lasting influence on its attitudes and behaviour.

The Act of Union of 1840

To end the stalemate, Durham, in his famous report, recommended that the government be entrusted to a single Legislature that was decidedly English. The ideal solution would have been to federate all the British colonies, but there was not enough time. Aiming at essentials, London decided to join together in a single legislature the Assemblies of Upper and Lower Canada, and in 1840 passed the Act of Union. Even though the population of Lower Canada was larger than that of Upper Canada, the two provinces had the same number of representatives in the Assembly; moreover, Lower Canada had to assume an equal share of the substantially higher debt of Upper Canada.

Since all the representatives from Upper Canada were Anglophones - as were some from Lower Canada Governor Sydenham could, at last, count on an English majority. Thinking it had made the Francophones powerless, England granted to the Parliament of the Union responsible government and the control over taxes and spending that Upper Canada, and in particular Lower Canada, had demanded in vain. Because they were a minority, however, Francophones would be unable to reap the benefits of those measures.

The Act of Union abolished the use of French in the Legislature. However, the Francophone representatives quickly discovered that British parliamentary procedures allowed them to bring the debate to a standstill and that the interaction of the parties required mutual concessions: since they did not have real political equality, they sought at least parliamentary equality. Accordingly, they succeeded in having the use of the French language reestablished in the Assembly in 1849; they stopped several attempts at assimilation; they were able to defend and promote their interests and, in particular, to hamper Anglophone territorial and commercial expansion. In short, they turned against its authors the plan that was meant to hold them in check, and once again changes had to be considered.

In 1864, when debates on the projected federation began, the situation of the two peoples had changed considerably since 1763. Thanks to a strong immigration policy, Anglophones had added the supremacy of numbers to the political, economic and military supremacy they already enjoyed. And faced with the United States they began to dream of spreading from coast to coast and of linking by railway existing and future communities stretching across the country from East to West; they dreamed of a country which would reap maximum advantages from the industrial revolution, and they wanted this country to be theirs.

Francophones were also in a better position than before: thanks to "the revenge of the cradle" they had increased their population considerably and extended their hold on the territory; they had developed good, solid institutions-social, educational and cultural-since the 1837 rebellion. They had developed not only a new elite, but also an original way of life and a culture of their own as manifested by the work of their craftsmen, artists and thinkers. And though their determination and skills had won them major gains in the political arena, albeit limited and precarious, in the economic field, big business and industry were more difficult of access than ever and they had control only in agriculture.

The 1867 Federation

At the constitutional conferences of 1864 and 1866, the Quebec delegates and those from other provinces were pursuing very different goals. Upper Canada in particular wanted a supraprovincial parliament, endowed with as many important powers as possible, to preside over the destiny of the new country; Quebec on the other hand wanted its own responsible government, with a large degree of autonomy, that would guarantee once and for all the existence and progress of the Quebec people - a government that would be their real government. Opposition between a centralized federation and a decentralized confederation was felt from the start.

The first idea finally won out. Quebecers did gain responsible and autonomous government, but with its autonomy limited to jurisdictions seen then as being primarily of local interest. Agriculture and immigration were to be shared jurisdictions. The federal parliament would have exclusive powers over all other jurisdictions deemed essential to the development of a state: transportation, criminal law, money, banks, fisheries, excise and customs, interprovincial and international trade; the federal government could tax and spend as it wished, make laws concerning any issue that it declared to be in the national interest, disallow any provincial law that seemed to threaten its poolers and take over any jurisdiction not provided for in the Constitution. In case of disagreement or challenge, the Privy Council in London would be the final arbiter between the federal government and the provinces.

A Confederation in Name only

It is obvious that this new regime was a Confederation in name only. The provinces did not, in fact, delegate part of their powers to a parliament they had created; on the contrary, they were subject to a senior government that exercised in its own name the essential powers of a state. The architect of this new Constitution, John A. Macdonald, made no mystery of it: "... the Constitution confers on the General Legislature the general mass of sovereign legislation, the power to legislate on "all matters of a general character, not specially reserved for the local governments and legislatures." We thereby strengthen the Central Parliament, and make the Confederation one people and one government..."¹

In fact the new regime was so centralized that as early as 1868, the long established Legislature of Nova Scotia thought seriously of withdrawing and long remained convinced that it had lost the powers it was accustomed to exercising.

Was this federal system preferable for Quebecers to the one they had experienced under the Union? Politicians were divided on the issue: Antoine-Aimé Dorion's Liberal party denounced Confederation-it was termed- a fool's bargain-and opposed it violently. Several Conservative MPs were undecided. When the project was put to a vote in the Assembly, 27 Francophones from Quebec (two of whom represented ridings where the majority was Anglophone) approved it and 22 rejected it. As for the population, its wishes will never be known since the government refused to consult it in a referendum as Antoine-Aimé Dorion had requested.

A Province like the Others

Under the terms of the British North America Act, Quebec is not the homeland of a nation, but merely a province among others, first four, then five, then ten; a province like the others, with no more rights or powers than the smallest of them. Nowhere in the British North America Act is there talk of an alliance between two founding peoples, or of a pact between two nations; on the contrary, there is talk of political and territorial unity, and of a national government which essentially dictates the direction the regional governments are to take. The English provinces know the score since, despite regional differences, they have always considered the central government to be the "senior government", the one that takes precedence over the others-from the point of view of the heart as well as the mind-and the one to which one owes allegiance. It appears certain that in 1867, the Anglophones of Canada saw the British North America Act as simply a British law, not a pact between two nations.

Subjected to outside political control even within its own boundaries, Quebec is in the same position in relation to the central government. In 1867, since it accounted for only one-third of the Canadian population, it could elect only 65 members of parliament out of 181 -not enough to allow it to continue, as it had done under the Union, to prevent the passage of laws and measures that were harmful to its interests. The expansion of English Canada could thus proceed unhindered, especially since London, in passing the British North America Act, had guaranteed a loan to build the first intercolonial railway; ten years later, the new regime would create three new provinces.

Tradeoffs between parties, which had been to their advantage under the Union, now played against Quebecers: by dividing the group representing them, they decreased its numerical importance and effectiveness. While Quebec maintained enough weight to gain concessions and promises during election campaigns, its weakness in the House largely cancelled out these advantages.

Francophones as a Minority

The federal regime thus sanctioned, and favoured as well, the supremacy of English Canada. It was natural that in such a regime the interests and aspirations of Quebecers and Francophones in other provinces should take second place.

In 1885, all of Quebec took the side of Louis Riel, who was fighting for the survival of Francophone communities in the West. The federal government, on the contrary, fought against him, and Louis Riel was hanged.

When the province of Manitoba was created, it had a slight majority of Francophones and the 1870 constitution guaranteed the rights of the French language. In the 1890S, however, the Manitoba government abolished French schools and the use of French in the House as we11 as in the documents of the Legislature.

At the turn of the century, the federal government did nothing to improve the deplorable economic situation of hundreds of thousands of Quebecers, shut in on their farms or unable to find work in the cities; nor did it do anything to stem the tide of migration to New England, where they were doomed to assimilation. The central government preferred to devote its energies to the implementation of its "national policy",² which endowed Ontario with a solid industrial infrastructure from which it subsequently benefited greatly.

From 1900 to 1920, all the Francophone minorities outside Quebec-had to fight against their provincial governments, which were restricting the use of French in schools-going so far as to abolish it in Ontario-and making it very difficult, if not impossible, to establish French schools.

In 1914, despite firm and virtually unanimous opposition from Quebec, Canada entered the war. When, in addition, Ottawa imposed conscription, Quebec rose in revolt: crowds poured into the streets and conscripts hid; the demonstrations were severely repressed and the conscripts hunted down.

With the Statute of Westminster, passed in 1931, Canada freed itself of the last remnants of its subjection to Britain; however, Quebec remained in the same state of subservience to Ottawa; the Supreme Court, whose members are all appointed by the federal government, replaced the Privy Council as final arbiter of the Federation.

The Second World War gave rise to another crisis between Quebec and Canada. Quebec was opposed to conscription. Ottawa submitted the issue to a general referendum: English Canada answered with an overwhelming yes, while Francophones categorically said no. Conscription was ordered.

Though some federal laws belatedly attempted to encourage bilingualism in central institutions, these examples show that Francophones were never regarded in Canada as a society with a history, a culture and aspirations of its own. They were seen at best as an important linguistic minority with no collective rights or particular powers, one that must sooner or later melt into the Canadian whole, as English Canada long believed.

However, during the Second World War and because of it, Quebec definitely entered the industrial era; the result was an unprecedented stirring up of ideas in the population at large: the old sociological, intellectual, moral and political concepts were challenged and Quebec slowly discovered what it lacked, what it needed, what its resources were. Aspiring to enter the modern era, Quebec experienced a new vitality that the centralizing federal government dating from 1867 is still systematically trying to contain.

Chapter Two. Quebec's Experience of Federalism

No political system has an absolute value and federalism, for example, is not in itself good or bad. Indeed, it is obvious that it is not on the basis of theoretical arguments that a political system can be justified or condemned, but rather by examining the way it is applied and its long term effects on a specific population.

From the Anglophone point of view, for instance, Canadian federalism may be judged favourably and rightly so, if it answers the aspirations and serves the interests of that group; but another group-in this case Francophones-can no less justifiably judge the same political system unfavourably if it does not correspond to their aspirations or serve their interests.

Though federalism is not necessarily synonymous with poverty and political domination, neither is it a guarantee of freedom or a high standard of living; and it is no more the formula of the future than the unitary state is the formula of the past. In fact there are several kinds of federalism: some are found in rich countries, others in poor countries; some in democratic regimes, others in dictatorships.

In an area where everything is relative, there is a need for caution and discriminating judgment.

In Canada in recent years, federalism has been the object of severe criticism from many quarters. It is impossible here to review every element of that criticism, to analyse it through how citizens perceive the Canadian reality, or to evaluate the criteria on which their judgment is based. It is important, instead, to encourage people to embark on some real soul-searching between now and the Referendum, to distinguish between essentials and details and, in order to do that, to study federalism as Quebec has experienced it, and from the point of view of Quebecers.

Provincial Autonomy and Federalism

To grasp the essentials, one must go back to the beginning of Confederation in the 1860s, and to the motives which finally led Canada to a federal system rather than the unitary system some people had proposed. For if a combination of economic, financial and military causes explain why the British colonies joined together in 1867, it does not explain the federal character of the system.

Quebecers' determination not to live through another Union and to obtain as much control as possible over their own institutions, through a government that belonged to them, was the main reason for the federal character of the 1867 Constitution. John A. Macdonald, who well understood the desire of Quebecers for autonomy, declared many times that they would never accept a unitary system.

Quebec's aspiring to autonomy was one of the main reasons for the creation of the Canadian federal system. the unitary dream of English Canadians, however, caused them to interpret Canadian federalism very differently from Quebecers, a situation which gave rise to many misunderstandings.

The Centralizing Thrust

In 1867, Quebec acquired a certain political autonomy insofar as the central government scrupulously respected the jurisdictions reserved for the provinces. Yet in the very first years of the federal system, Ottawa intervened in areas that the provinces, and Quebec in particular, regarded as theirs. This trend towards centralization, more obvious at some times than at others but always present, grew stronger after the Second World War and particularly in recent years.

It is noteworthy, moreover, that Ottawa has constantly sought not so much to confirm or extend its authority over vast and costly jurisdictions, as to take over the political levers with which a modern government can contribute to shaping the society of the future. In this respect, the federal government's action is a greater threat to Quebec than to any other province, since it intensifies the minority status of Quebecers and makes them increasingly dependent on the very level of government whose power they wished to escape. All of Quebec's political leaders, regardless of their party affiliations - Duplessis, Sauvé, Lesage, Johnson, Bertrand and Bourassa - fought for Quebecers to have increasing control over their own affairs; none of them, however, succeeded in stopping the trend towards centralization, even if at times it was slowed down.

What is the explanation for this?

The Causes of Centralization

In the opinion of the Quebec government, there were four major reasons for the trend towards centralization.

First, the increased powers and influence of the central government corresponded to the aspirations of the English-Canadian community, which quite naturally saw this "national" government as the main instrument of its progress as a society. In Canada, the majority is inclined to favour centralization, whereas Quebecers definitely are not.

Secondly, the central government was able to take advantage of certain crises in order to intervene in provincial jurisdictions: the Depression, the Second World War, post-war social needs, unemployment, inflation, energy-all were pretexts for repeated federal intervention, with the consent of the Canadian majority, which deemed essential that Ottawa respond to the severity of the problems by "national" solutions, disregarding the allocation of jurisdictions set down in the Constitution. The law is born of necessity, and Quebec was subjected, despite itself, to the law of the majority.

Third, the wording of the British North America Act favoured the expansion of the central government by giving it all the powers that are not specifically allocated to the provinces. It was fairly simple in this respect for Ottawa to take over new areas not covered by the 1867 Constitution: income security, research, urban affairs, radio and television, recreation, sports, consumer affairs, the environment and many others! The British North America Act reserved the future for the central government; this seems normal to the Canadian majority, but not to Quebec.

Finally, the increase in the central government's power was possible because its fiscal and financial resources were so much greater than the provinces', since the Constitution gave it the right to levy all kinds of taxes while limiting the provinces to what is called direct taxation.

Ottawa's Interventionism

It was at the time of the Second World War that Ottawa succeeded in obtaining most of its fiscal resources by borrowing taxes from the provinces for the duration of the conflict in exchange for subsidies, then later refusing to return them despite its definite promises. Only after severe tensions and continuous federal-provincial disputes were some of these taxes repatriated by the provinces, thanks in large measure to a spectacular move by Prime Minister Duplessis who, by creating a provincial income tax in 1954, forced Ottawa to react. On its own initiative, Quebec thus reoccupied a fiscal field which it had only temporarily agreed to vacate during the war, but which the central government had retained.

It is true that the cost of administration in the provinces and the programs for which they are responsible have increased considerably since the end of the Second World War; but because federal grants for these programs are earmarked, they do not give the provinces any greater freedom, so that in many areas they must be content with managing programs conceived and directed by the federal government. Thus the provinces' freedom of action is reduced and their initiative undermined; they are subject to priorities set by others, and their decision making powers have not grown in line with their budgets. Quebec, a distinct society, is all the more sensitive to this situation in that its Government must constantly adapt its action to pan-Canadian programs and to criteria ill-suited to the specific needs of its population.

Invasion of Social Policy

Ottawa refused to return to the provinces the taxes it had borrowed because it deemed all these fiscal resources necessary for solving post-war problems, as well as to create a whole series of social programs under its responsibility and subject to federal standards: family allowances, old age pensions, unemployment insurance and later, hospital insurance, medicare, etc. It was only thanks to the tenacity of the Quebec government that in 1963 and 1964, for example, the Quebec Pension Plan and the Caisse de Dépot (Quebec Deposit and Investment Fund) resisted the federal will to create a single pension plan for the whole of Canada.

While paying taxes to Ottawa for their share of federal programs, Quebecers still had to finance the social measures they felt they required to fill their own needs.

Quebec, one of the few provinces that has adopted a supplementary family allowance plan, has just instituted a supplementary guaranteed income plan. Furthermore the Quebec government, whatever the party, in power, has always maintained that an integrated social security system administered entirely by Quebec-if it repatriated the fiscal resources required-would be more logical, less costly, better adapted and consequently more advantageous to Quebecers than the present system.

Invasion of Labour Relations

More recently, by introducing wage and price controls, the federal government, invoking inflation, despite Quebec's opposition and with the authorization of the Supreme Court, intervened directly in collective bargaining and the setting of prices, two areas which were previously considered to be under provincial jurisdiction. The special problems that these new federal encroachments created for Quebec are common knowledge, particularly their effects on the social climate.

Invasion of Municipal Affairs

The encroachments of the federal government have not been limited to social affairs. Even municipalities, which come under exclusive provincial jurisdiction, are offered direct subsidies, resulting in confusion and complicating the implementation of a provincial policy respecting municipal affairs, be it in the areas of housing, mass transportation, the environment or recreation.

The task force on urban affairs chaired by Claude Castonguay made, in its report, a severe indictment of this federal invasion:

"Even if each federal intervention, taken separately and viewed from a special perspective, may seem useful and well founded, when all of these interventions are considered together, their effect is to make the federal government omnipresent in Quebec's urban and local affairs.

The federal government encourages local authorities to make certain decisions by using the carrot of subsidies and low-interest loans.

Since it is a higher level, it can afford to ignore the principle of fiscal responsibility at the local level, and increase its gifts. By acting in this way, it responds to the demands of well-organized groups that want subsidized services and are under the illusion they will get them for nothing. Such a process can only reduce the Quebec government to the role of a beggar vis-à-vis the federal government"³

This situation is not restricted to municipal affairs, far from it!

Natural Resources

The energy crisis gave the central government a pretext for becoming involved in the management of natural resources, despite the fact they are the exclusive property of the provinces: through its power over interprovincial and international trade, it "nationalized" the marketing of oil and gas. This new intrusion is extremely dangerous for Québec, which abounds in natural resources-most of them renewable and therefore inexhaustible-and could make it lose control of its most important development tool. The threat is particularly serious since, on this issue, the federal government can count on support from Ontario, which is much less well endowed in this respect than the other provinces.

The federal strategy regarding uranium also provides food for thought. Shortly after the Second World War, invoking its jurisdiction in the area of national defence, Ottawa took over the management of atomic energy, while leaving mining to the provinces. As federal policy evolved and uranium was no longer used for military purposes, the justification was no longer valid: since 1977, this time invoking the national interest, Ottawa has attempted to take over the management of uranium completely-despite the unanimous opposition of the provinces which fear that the administration of mining may come under a double jurisdiction. The pretexts have changed, but the federal will to centralize remains.

Other Areas

As a reminder, other areas could be mentioned: the challenge to the agreement on maritime fisheries, the efforts to control securities and insurance, using criminal law to control lotteries and the declaratory power to regulate, in Quebec, the telephone system, grain trade and flour mills.

But there is worse still ...

Invasion of Culture

Culture is so closely linked to the language, identity and soul of a people that, within Quebec, it naturally comes under Quebec jurisdiction. But when radio appeared, it became evident that the central government did not see it that way. Radio, and later television, through an interpretation of the courts, were placed under exclusive federal jurisdiction. Ottawa later demanded and, obtained exclusive jurisdiction over cable distribution, waiting to do the same for pay television and teleprocessing. The central government consented at most to negotiate administrative arrangements with the provinces and to issue permits for educational television. Thus Ottawa has control over a powerful instrument, while Quebec has no say about programming that has a considerable cultural impact, which is of vital importance to Quebec.

Since Ottawa perceives the need to create and assert a Canadian identity distinct from the American identity, it has paid attention to all areas of cultural life. It intervenes heavily in all the provinces as well as in all cultural fields: art, literature, parks, theatre, heritage, museums, books, films, recreation, amateur sport, post-secondary education and vocational training. Controlling increasing amounts of money for cultural purposes, it spends even more in Quebec than Quebec spends itself. It goes ahead without consultation, arbitrarily, according to its own standards, refusing any coordination. Yet it would be far more logical and efficient if Quebec were to implement the cultural policy it now has, and for which it has primary responsibility.

A Dilemma

Although, in 1867, Quebecers wanted to keep in Quebec the control of all their social and cultural institutions as well as the fiscal and financial resources required to develop those institutions, and although they thought that federalism would allow them to achieve that goal, 112 years later, it must be admitted that the evolution of the federal political system has led instead to the transfer to Ottawa of major responsibilities which, considering their social and cultural impact, should have come under Quebec control. Thus it is Quebec's autonomy that is threatened by that evolution, since the central government is now in a position to play a role which normally should be played by the Government of Quebec-the only one that truly belongs to the Quebec nation.

In fact, the Quebec government has always faced a dilemma: either give in to the trend towards centralization inherent in the Canadian federal system, or uphold at any cost the exercise of its constitutional rights, despite federal intrusions.

Until now, no Quebec government, regardless of the party in power, has agreed to the first Solution and the eventual loss of its political autonomy. In varying degrees, all Quebec governments have accepted the second by resisting federal intrusions and fighting for their autonomy.

The choice of resistance over submission had a definite impact on the way the system functions, an impact which must be considered when Canadian federalism is weighed in the balance.

Federal-Provincial Overlapping

Besides the ongoing conflicts between the central government and the Quebec government, Quebec's determination to resist federal intrusions and to protect its autonomy as much as possible has resulted in ever greater overlapping of the activities of the two governments. These overlaps, which are naturally very costly, are the inevitable consequence of a constitutional situation no one ever wanted-or was able-to clarify. It forces governments, both federal and provincial, into a climate of competition with no clear division of powers and resources, in an attempt to get around a constitutional problem that has become impossible to solve and to satisfy the needs of the population.

In 1937, according to a study by the Ecole nationals d'administration publique, programs already overlapped in 15 sectors out of 36; today 34 out of 36 sectors are affected. As an example, small and medium-sized Quebec firms are now entangled in 162 aid programs or forms of assistance, leading to 317 various kinds of intervention provided by 79 federal or provincial agencies. This is no doubt a world record for an economy like Quebec's!

Today it can be said that overlapping is a rule in Canadian federalism, stemming from the system itself. A combination of political and economic forces led to the development of two governmental systems with almost identical purposes, and thus to generalized administrative disorder and, in particular, to a waste of money and energy that is difficult to measure accurately.

In 1940, the Rowell-Sirois Commission understood very well the nature of the problem and the cost to taxpayers of the often contradictory action taken by the two levels of government.

"These factors point to the inevitability of some waste and maladjustment in such a federation as the Dominion of Canada, even if a high degree of co-operation' and unanimity can be maintained between the several governments. The aim of administrations must, therefore, be to confine waste as much as possible to what is inherent and unavoidable...

But many wastes are of nature which such administrative surveys are unable to disclose since they arise from unwise, static and outmoded policies which fail to change with the needs of a dynamic economy." ⁴

Some of the consequences of overlapping are: incoherence and contradictions that confuse the population; increased complexity of relations between citizens and government institutions; the frequent need to duplicate procedures, such as preparing two tax returns; less and less efficiency in politics and administration, as well as in government departments and agencies; and finally, a higher price to pay than would be the case if a single government provided all the services.

Meetings, Committees, Conferences

In an attempt to escape this administrative muddle, that great Canadian invention, the committee, came forth. Committees have been called on to ensure the functioning of a federalism which obviously no longer meets the needs of the citizens. In 1957, there were 64 federal/provincial bodies; in 1967, there were 119; in 1977, there were 158-and in that year alone they met 335 times.

In Canada there are more and more meetings, more and more often-and probably with fewer and fewer results. For example, between April 1978 and March 1979, Quebec took part in the following federal-provincial events: 70 meetings involving 246 civil servants and 46 meetings at the ministerial level requiring the presence of 334 delegates from Quebec.

Poorly Adapted Economic Policy

While everyone ran from committee to committee, the federal government, with the main levers of the economy at its disposal, was free to enforce its own policies and direct economic growth throughout Canada as it pleased.

Transportation

From the beginning the railway was one of the main tools contributing to the development of Ontario and the Canadian West and it continues to serve the interests of those regions today.

Only 12% of the Canadian railway network is in Quebec; Quebec has only 0.9 miles of railway per capita compared to the Canadian average of 2.1 miles; and products entering or leaving Quebec are subject to rail rates about 40% higher than the Canadian average.

Location of Industry

The Canadian steel industry is located mainly in southern Ontario, where it takes advantage of preferential railway rates. The same is true for heavy and durable goods industries using high technology and providing well-paid jobs. Quebec was the location for many industries producing non-durable goods, using low technology and requiring plentiful, cheap labour.

The Auto Pact between Canada and the United States made it possible to concentrate nearly 90% of automobile production in Ontario, with all the advantages of subcontracting. This pact, signed in 1965, directly or indirectly created more than 210 000 jobs in Ontario, in the first six years; it brought almost nothing to Quebec. This did not prevent Ottawa from recently granting a $40 000 000 subsidy to the Ford Company to locate another large plant in Ontario.

Beginning in the 1960s Ottawa, as a member government in the GATT commercial agreements, maintained a systematic policy of lowering the protection granted to the traditional sectors located mainly in Quebec, thereby causing the loss of tens of thousands of jobs. The situation became so serious that, under pressure from the Quebec government, supported by all economic agents in Quebec, Ottawa was forced into temporary retreat and imposed quotas on the entry of footwear and clothing.

On the other hand, and despite the obvious advantages for these traditional sectors of the Quebec economy, Ottawa fiercely resisted Quebec's formula for abolishing the sales tax.

Moreover, as the 400-odd crown corporations and other federal agencies are almost all located in Ontario, it is not surprising that on the average, between 1961 and 1977, only 20.6% of federal job creating expenditures were made in Quebec (salaries, goods, services, subsidies and investments) compared to more than 40% in Ontario.

In another, not unrelated sector, several research organizations were created by the federal government in different areas-among them the important National Research Council; most are located in Ottawa. Furthermore, almost all the federal laboratories, now employing more than 2 000 scientists, were built in that city.

Agriculture

In agriculture, federal policy has always favoured the development of certain products in specific regions, while discouraging them elsewhere. Consider, for example, the policy aimed at helping western wheat producers, which never had any equivalent in Quebec although Quebec had formerly been a net exporter of grain and still maintains excellent possibilities in this area. Consider also policies that forced Quebec producers to remain in fields where there was no opportunity for expansion. Lacking a market, Quebec farmers had to develop other products, often without any federal help, and sometimes despite almost insurmountable obstacles.

It is obvious that the agricultural policy of the federal government, by helping some and neglecting others, upset the economic balance of agriculture in entire regions.

The federal policy of assisting the transportation of agricultural products is another intervention that is harmful to the diversification of agriculture in Quebec: its effect is often to wipe out one of our main comparative advantages in agriculture, i.e. our closeness to markets. Thus it costs no more to deliver New Brunswick potatoes to Quebec City than to deliver them from Portneuf to the same place. The Quebec market, and particularly the Montreal market, is open to producers from other provinces, though Quebec producers are not given the same advantages in the Toronto market for example.

An Urgent Need for Action

While the federal government continues to invade our jurisdictions, and impose policies that clash with our interests, the demographic weight of Quebecers and of Francophones outside Quebec is constantly decreasing. Demographer Robert Maheux predicts that in 1991, 73% of citizens of French ethnic origin outside Quebec will have ceased to use the French language. Another demographer, Jacques Henripin, predicts that by about the year 2000 between 92% and 95% of Francophones in Canada will be living in Quebec. As for Quebecers, who made up around 36% of the Canadian population in 1851, in 1971 they accounted for only 28%, and this proportion will drop to 23% by 2001 if the current trend is maintained, because of Quebec's low rate of birth and immigration.

These demographic losses necessarily result in a marked decrease of the political role played by Quebecers in Canada. From 1867 to 1979, the number of Quebec MPs in Ottawa increased by 10, from 65-70; the number of MPs from other provinces increased by 91, from 116-207. And the trend grows stronger: in the last election there was one new seat in Quebec, 17 in the rest of Canada. It is foreseen in 20 years that the rest of Canada will have 250 MPs and Quebec only 75. While they were more than 1/3 of federal MPs in 1867, Quebecers will account for less than ¼ by the end of the century.

Under these circumstances, it would be an illusion to believe that, in future, Francophones can play a determining role in the Government of Canada. On the contrary, they will be more and more of a minority and English Canada will find it increasingly easy to govern without them. In that respect, far from being an anomaly, the Clark government is a sign of things to come.

Given these prospects, and taking into account Quebec's experience of federalism, particularly in recent years, Quebecers feel it is urgent to take action before it is too late. Since Canadian federalism has -proved unable to ensure for Quebecers the political autonomy they have always sought, the time has come to decide whether to replace this system by another or to attempt once more to make more or less far-reaching changes.

Chapter Three. Federalism: an Impasse

In the opinion of the Quebec government, recent history has proved it is impossible to renew Canadian federalism in such a way as to meet the needs of both Quebec and Canada.

Indeed, many attempts have been made over the years to change our federal system in depth. They were all in vain, despite great efforts. What is the meaning of so many repeated failures in such an important area?

The Depression and Centralization

During the Depression, some of the major shortcomings of federalism became evident as Canada proved unable to pull itself out of its state of stagnation. At first, everyone held firm to traditional measures: colonization programs, public works, direct relief, limits on working hours, etc., were just so many forms of almost useless temporary relief. Soon the federal, as well as provincial and municipal governments, were overwhelmed by the magnitude of the problem, and some provinces and many municipalities were even threatened with bankruptcy.

It became obvious that the very organization of Canadian federalism had to be reconsidered: the Liberal government of Mackenzie King set up the Rowell-Sirois Commission, whose mandate seems to have been lifted from today's headlines: to make recommendations on the division of legislative powers and fiscal resources.

There were two possible solutions: either to redistribute powers between the various levels of governments in accordance with their fiscal resources, or redistribute those resources so the provinces could fulfill their constitutional responsibilities. Choosing to reinforce the centralizing character of the federation, the Commissioners proposed that Ottawa be given responsibility for the new unemployment insurance and old-age pension plans, by giving it a monopoly on personal income taxes, corporate taxes and succession duties. In compensation, they suggested that Ottawa give the provinces annual subsidies, the amount to be determined in accordance with a pan-Canadian norm. As for the distribution of powers, the Commission suggested a new mechanism: delegating jurisdiction from one level to the other according to needs and circumstances.

This "new federalism" was considered completely unacceptable by Quebec and some other provinces; at this point the Second World War broke out and the Commission's recommendations were temporarily set aside, except for the question of unemployment insurance.

The Post-War Period

When the war was over, the federal government launched a formidable centralizing attack, which is still going on. Quebec immediately put up a strong resistance. Since Ottawa was slowly but surely undermining resistance in the Anglophone provinces-Ontario was the last to give in, in 1952-Prime Minister Duplessis created his own constitutional commission in 1953, the Tremblay Commission, which proposed a quite different view of federalism:

• sovereignty of the provinces in their areas of jurisdiction
• equality of the two levels of government
• fiscal autonomy of the provinces
• recognition of the Quebec government as the national government of French Canadians (i.e. of Quebecers).

The Report of the Tremblay Commission gave a new impetus to Quebec's fight for autonomy, one that was to be particularly lively during the "Quiet Revolution" of the 1960s. The many reforms undertaken at the time to better respond to the needs of Quebecers illustrated more than ever the need for a new division of constitutional powers. Because of the presence and the actions of the federal government in many areas where it wanted to act, Quebec found it difficult to plan and implement the measures it dreamed of; therefore, to consolidate its own powers, it was essential to exert continuous pressure on Ottawa.

Those pressures were not exerted in vain. Quebec opted out of some shared cost programs; it widened its room for fiscal manoeuvre, while its needs constantly increased; it created its own pension plan and the Caisse de dépot; (the Quebec Deposit and Investment Fund) and finally it signed agreements with France.

For a time, Quebec succeeded in halting and even containing Ottawa's centralizing thrust. Thus in the case of taxation the new arrangements meant only a partial return to the 1939 situation, and Quebec increased its fiscal freedom more through the contributions of its taxpayers than through the revenues returned by Ottawa.

The Laurendeau-Dunton Commission

Faced with the upsurge in Quebec, which threatened the future of the federal order, the Canadian government, then led by Lester B. Pearson, created in 1963 the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in Canada, with a mandate to recommend steps to ensure the development of the Canadian federation according to the principle of equality between two founding peoples. As early as its preliminary hearing in November 1963, the Commission raised two questions :

• What in fact does equality of the two languages and the two cultures mean, and under what conditions can it be realized?
• Do Canadians want this equality? Do they accept the conditions under which it could be achieved?

Later, in their first working document, the Commissioners reported one of their findings, then raised a question:

• The equality in question is not equality of citizens before the law, which is already part of the law of the land, but the equality of cultures and societies.
• How can the requirements of that equality be reconciled within the framework of a ten-province federation and of a parliamentary democracy in which the political representatives of the two cultures are unequal in number?

From that moment, it became obvious that the answers would not be easy. More than ten years have passed since the Laurendeau-Dunton report was published. It is interesting to review, with the perspective allowed by time, how the Commissioners saw the Canadian problem:

"Canada is in the most critical period of its history since Confederation. We believe that there is a crisis, in the sense that Canada has come to a time when decisions must be taken and developments must occur leading either to its break-up, or to a new set-of conditions for its future existence ...

The chief protagonists, whether they are entirely conscious of it or not, are French-speaking Quebec and English-speaking Canada. And it seems to us to be no longer the traditional conflict between a majority and a minority. It is rather a conflict between two majorities: that which is a majority in all Canada, and that which is a majority in the entity of Quebec. That is to say, French-speaking Quebec acted for a long time as though at least it had accepted the idea of being merely a privileged "ethnic minority"' Today, the kind of opinion we met so often in the province regards Quebec practically as an autonomous society, and expects her to be recognized as such. This attitude goes back to a fundamental expectation for French Canada, that is, to be an equal partner with English-speaking Canada ...

English-speaking Canadians as a whole must come to recognize the existence of a vigourous French-speaking society within Canada... They have to face the fact that, if Canada is to continue to exist, there must be a true partnership, and that the partnership must be worked out as between equals. They must be prepared to discuss in a forthright, open-minded way the practical implications of such a partnership."⁵

The report offered partial answers to the question raised by what the Commissioners called "the central idea of the mandate", that is to say equality between the two peoples.

"The two dominant cultures in Canada are embodied in distinct societies... We recognized the main elements of a distinct French-speaking society in Quebec. The same may be said of the other culture in the English-speaking provinces... The fundamental unity of the English-speaking society appears to us beyond question, and is particularly exemplified by the relative ease with which members of the various provincial units-and even members of the partial societies-find a common meeting around in the central government, and enter its Public Service...

As we understand our mandate, equality should be the equal partnership not only of the two peoples which founded Confederation but also of each of their respective languages and cultures, then, the equal partnership of all who speak either language and participate in either culture, whatever their ethnic origin. For us the principle of equal partnership takes priority over all historical and legal considerations...

Individual equality can fully exist only if each community has, throughout the country, the means to progress within its culture and to express that culture. To this end it will have its own institutions in certain fields, while in other sectors it will be free to participate, on satisfactory terms, in common institutions and agencies...

Let us consider another dimension of equality between the two communities-the political dimension. This covers the possibilities for each society to choose its own institutions or, at least, to have the opportunity to participate fully in making political decisions within a framework shared with the other community.

The collective aspect of equality is here still more evident; it is not cultural growth and development at the individual level which is at stake, but the degree of self determination which one society can exercise in relation to another. We have in mind the power of decision of each group and its freedom to act, not only in its cultural life but in all aspects of its collective life. We are no longer concerned with the characteristics which distinguish the two communities qualitatively, or even with their respective social and economic positions, but with the extent of the control each has over its government or governments.

... A politically dominant majority easily takes its advantages for granted and does not take into account the difficulties of the minority, especially when that minority is treated with a degree of liberality, or at least an appearance of liberality, in cultural matters. But as soon as the minority is aware of its collective life as a whole, it may very well aspire to the mastery of its own existence and begin to look beyond cultural liberties. It raises the question of its political status. It feels that its future and the progress of its culture are not entirely secure, that they are perhaps limited, within a political structure dominated by a majority composed of the other group.

... This viewpoint, so hotly opposed by some, is deeply entrenched In Quebec. It has even been, in recent years, at the root of some of the most spectacular, if not the most serious, manifestations of the crisis in Canada.⁶

Those lines were written in 1967!

Yet the Commission's report was to remain unheeded with respect to one of its fundamental points, political equality. The death of André Laurendeau, co-chairman of the Commission, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau's rise to power, the fact that the Commission did not translate into concrete proposals its ideas of political equality, all of these things were contributory factors in the shelving of this essential element of the Laurendeau Dunton report. Hoping nevertheless to solve the Quebec problem, Ottawa agreed to implement some of the report's recommendations concerning language equality at the individual level. But the fundamental questions the Commissioners raised as early as 1963 remained without issue: What does the equality of the two societies mean in fact? How can this equality by reconciled within a ten-province federation?

Revision of the Constitution, 1968-1971

Many people hoped to find those answers in what was to be the greatest effort to revise the Constitution in Canadian history. From February 1968 to June 1971, first ministers, cabinet ministers and civil servants met frequently, sometimes under television lights, sometimes behind closed doors, to review the problem of the Constitution in its entirety in order to find a satisfactory solution. For three and a half years many experts were consulted, hundreds of documents were drafted, dozens of official stands were taken. Yet in June 1971, after the Victoria Conference, the whole undertaking collapsed, and the Canadian problem loomed as large as before.

It would be impossible to summarize the story of that great debate here, even briefly. Let us simply remember that Quebec would have given up the principle and positions it deemed essential if it had endorsed the Victoria constitutional charter; only this would have assured the success of the conference-from the point of view of Ottawa and the other provinces. All through the many conferences and working meetings, Quebec's ideas and those of English Canada never seemed reconcilable. While Quebec wanted above all a new division of powers that would have given constitutional recognition to the Quebec nation and guaranteed it the means to satisfy its aspirations, English Canada was interested primarily in patriating the Constitution, modernizing federal institutions such as the Senate and the Supreme Court, and in certain aspects of the distribution of powers between Ottawa and the provinces. As for the federal government, which wanted most of all to incorporate in the Constitution a charter of fundamental and linguistic rights, it largely shared the views of English Canada.

From the very beginning Quebec and the rest of Canada differed fundamentally on the very nature of the problem: the status of Quebec and Quebecers, as a society, within Canada. English Canada put the accent on individual rights and preferred to ignore any reference to collective rights; Quebec, on the contrary, maintained that the Canadian crisis could be overcome only by officially recognizing the national duality of Canada, and accepting the political consequences of this recognition.

The Pepin-Robarts Task Force

Surprised by the results of the 1976 Quebec election, Ottawa moved to create a new commission of inquiry the Pepin-Robarts Task Force on Canadian unity, which submitted its report in January 1979. As was to be expected, it provides a new diagnosis of what is called the Canadian crisis. Although they also sound the alarm on the urgency of revising the Canadian Constitution, the Commissioners' analysis is different from that of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission. The new Commissioners abandoned the theme of equality between peoples and chose instead that of national unity: from a search for equality between the two founding peoples, they return to the simple recognition of duality. This change in perspective, which deserves to be emphasized, is particularly noticeable because the Commissioners even specify that the dualistic character of the country is moderated, outside Quebec, by strong feelings of regionalism. In short, they tell Quebecers that "their" problem is only one of the six major problems Canada faces-the other five being the demands of the native peoples, a difficult economic situation, the alienation of the Canadian West, the awakening of new Canadians, and the questioning of the role of the central government.

Although the Pepin-Robarts report did not really propose a Solution that entirely satisfied Quebecers, it did recommend increasing Quebec's powers, particularly in cultural and social affairs. Yet, only a few weeks after it was published it had, to all intents and purposes, been shelved by Ottawa, along with all the other reports of this type. And since the Clark government has come to power, there has been no mention of it.

The Final Efforts

The most recent series of negotiations, which lasted from October 1978 to February 1979, constituted a desperate, last-minute federal effort (Bill C-60) to show Quebecers it was possible to agree on certain constitutional amendments. The failure of the exercise, all told, only confirms the opposite.

Furthermore, it is unlikely that the new Conservative government will really reactivate this file, for despite its election promises it does not seem prepared to face the constitutional problem head on, since it is not one of its priorities.

In the view of the Quebec government, the lamentable story of the many vain attempts to revise the Constitution proves how illusory it is to hope that federalism can ever be renewed in such a way as to satisfy both Quebec and the rest of Canada.

Deadlock

An insurmountable obstacle blocks the way to "renewed federalism", one that has stopped all those who have tried to bring about fundamental changes in the federal system: in order to strengthen Quebec, to build it, Quebecers must, as the system now stands, ask English Canadians to undermine and dismantle their national institutions.

To respond to Quebec's needs and ensure its development, it would indeed be necessary to transfer to all the provinces so many powers that now belong to Ottawa that it would add up, in the eyes of English Canadians, to the almost total disappearance of the central government. As we have already said, English Canadians insisted as early as 1867 on giving priority to their "national" government, just as they have tended in each crisis to increase its power and its means of action. How can we hope then, within the present system, that they will abandon something it took them more than a hundred years to build? Their determination to preserve their institutions is probably equalled only by Quebec's determination to satisfy its needs and aspirations.

The Logic of the System

Of course English Canadians say they are ready to improve the system. But we must be wary of words: the expression "renewed federalism", very much in fashion these days, can have many meanings.

Certain Quebecers, when they talk of "renewed federalism" because they are dissatisfied with the status quo, think of a serious and substantial transformation of the system, not a cosmetic job.

English Canadians, on the other hand, give quite a different meaning to the term: it is a "touched up" federalism that they want, since they feel that any reform must totally respect the role and the prerogatives of the central government, seen as the "national government" of all Canadians. This prior requirement implies maintaining federal control on levers that, in Quebec's view, are indispensable to its own progress.

The very balance of the system, as the Canadian majority wants it, requires that Quebec remain a province-or perhaps a territory-among ten others, and forbids the formal and concrete recognition of a Quebec nation. The fact that it is impossible, in the present federal framework, for Quebec to become a nation, constitutes the very basis of the Canada-Quebec political problem.

Special Status: an Illusion

Some Quebecers believed in good faith that the answer to the problem was to give Quebec a special status. The idea, fashionable during the sixties and taken up again with certain variations, seemed to have the advantage of answering a good many of Quebec's aspirations without forcing other provinces into constitutional rearrangements they do not want. But this solution was quickly rejected by English Canada, which was opposed to Quebec's possible acquisition of powers denied to the other provinces.

In any case, as former Prime Minister Trudeau often said, special status for Quebec would place Quebec Members of Parliament in Ottawa in an absurd and untenable position. How could they vote on federal laws that would apply to all of Canada except Quebec? How could they impose on Canadians taxes that Quebecers would not pay? And how could the prime minister or cabinet ministers come from Quebec, where many federal programs would not apply? The entire operation of responsible government would be paralyzed.

The Impossibility of Renewal

Of course, in an attempt to calm Quebec's fears, and confronted with certain obvious needs, the federal government has consented to certain arrangements or administrative compromises that are in no way basic reforms of the system: each compromise has been made because of a crisis; they have been automatically offered to all the provinces to avoid giving Quebec special treatment; they have avoided any constitutional amendment; and they have been made only to the extent that the federal government's supremacy in the areas involved was not weakened. In other words, the fundamental balance of the system must not be upset, something that would inevitably happen if Quebec changed its provincial status. All the constitutional debates of these past years make sense only if they are considered in terms of a change in status for Quebec. Quebec's approach to the issue of autonomy is not merely an administrative quarrel between Quebec and Ottawa; nor is it an expression of purely regional preoccupations to which some people would like to reduce Quebec's aspirations; it is the manifestation of the firm conviction of Quebecers that they constitute a distinct community and people. Here lies the sole reason for their profound concern; the skirmishes of politicians and civil servants are unimportant.

The irreconcilable difference in perspective thus largely explains why the efforts of recent years to revise the Constitution never got anywhere.

A Conclusion

One simple conclusion can be drawn from all these observations. If we want both to save the present system and to renew federalism, we will have to resign ourselves to giving up to the central government, in which Quebecers will always be a minority, an impressive number of prerogatives and decision-making centres that to date Quebec has been demanding for itself.

For Quebecers that would mean implicitly accepting the fact that control over some of their most vital affairs would go to a government over which they could never exert more than an indirect or passing influence; it would mean entrusting their interests and their future to others. Very few nations in the world would be satisfied with such an arrangement.

Let us finally dispose of this impossible "renewed federalism"; let us admit that there is no version that is acceptable to all of the supporters of the present system, and none that seems likely to be accepted in the foreseeable future. Thus it is obvious that to solve the Quebec-Canada political problem which the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission described more that fifteen years ago, a different formula must be found.

It is precisely this formula, which will satisfy both Quebec's needs for autonomy and the equally normal need of English Canada for cohesion, that the Quebec government intends to propose in the next chapter.

Chapter Four. A New Deal

If we are really looking for a new agreement between Quebec and the rest of Canada, it is absolutely essential to replace federalism by another constitutional formula.

This search for a new formula must be carried out with due consideration for the fundamental, legitimate preoccupations of Quebecers, who want to communicate and talk directly and freely with their neighbours and with other nations, who do not want to destroy Canada or to be completely separate from it, who wish to improve their situation, and who are determined to see that the changes to come are made democratically and without disorder.

The Government of Quebec fully shares and endorses these preoccupations.

The Way of the Future

Thinking of the future the Government of Quebec proposes a constitutional formula which would replace the present federal system and at the same time respect the legitimate feelings of Quebecers toward Canada. This new system, while freeing Quebec from Ottawa's domination, would not break up an economic community that extends from the Atlantic to the Pacific; it would ensure for Quebec a maximum of autonomy while maintaining the natural interdependence and the historical and human links that exist between Quebec and the rest of Canada; it would enable Quebec to institute the measures that it lacks at present, without forcing the other provinces to accept responsibilities they do not feel they need. This new system would provide permanent solutions to the many problems engendered by relations between Quebec and Ottawa over the years.

Of the two roads open to Quebecers-a federalism whose fundamental renewal is to all intents and purposes impossible because it would contradict the very nature of federalism, and a new agreement between Quebec and Canada capable of reconciling political autonomy and economic interdependence-the Government of Quebec has chosen the latter, sovereignty-association, a contemporary expression of Quebec's continuity, in brief a new deal.

The Modern Phenomenon of Association

The recent history of international relations shows that federalism can no longer be regarded-as the only formula capable of reconciling the objectives of autonomy and interdependence. Although it was fashionable in the past century, the federal formula must now give way to associations between sovereign countries. While no new federations are being created, economic associations are on the increase on every continent. It is not possible to mention them all, but we can draw up a table of the principal cases, many of which have come about in the past forty years.

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Modern Associations of Sovereign States

In Europe

• European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
• European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)
• European Economic Community (EEC) (Great Britain, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, Denmark, and soon, Greece, Spain and Portugal)
• The Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (Belgium and Luxembourg)
• Benelux (Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg)
• The Nordic Council (Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland)
• The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (Austria, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal)

In Latin America

• The Latin-American Free Trade Association (Argentina, Brazil, Chili, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia)
• The Sub-Regional Andean Integration Group (Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Chili, Colombia)
• The Central American Common Market (Guatemala, Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica)
• The Caribbean Community and Common Market (Antigua, Barbados, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Grenada, Dominica, St. Kitts-Nevis, Montserrat, St. Vincent, Anguilla)

In Africa

• The West African Economic Community (Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Mali, Niger, Senegal)
• The Central African Customs and Economic Union (Cameroon, Central African Empire, Popular Republic of the Congo,Gabon)
• The West African Monetary Union (Benin, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Mali)
• The Central Bank of Central African States (Cameroon, Central African Empire, Congo, Gabon, Tchad)

In Asia

• The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Indonesia, The Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand)

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These various associations of sovereign states are distinguished from one another by the nature of their activity and the degree of their integration, as well as by the history of relations between the member states and their various characteristics: population, culture, political system, etc.

The European communities are probably the most advanced examples of economic integration. Their activity is primarily economic, but ii also spills over into social policy and scientific policy, among other areas. The economic union between Belgium and Luxembourg, and the Benelux countries, which appeared before the European Economic Community, are part of the European movement toward economic integration, while preserving a certain cohesion of their own within the Nine. As for the European Free Trade Association, its economic links are rather weak.

On the other hand, the Nordic Council and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, while not as completely integrated, have a much more diversified activity.

Basing itself firmly on the historical trend of Quebec thinking, which has always sought to redefine relations between Quebec and the rest of Canada on a more egalitarian basis, the Government of Quebec proposes this type of modern formula of association between sovereign countries to ensure for Quebecers a better control of their own affairs, without shattering the Canadian economic framework.

Association in equality may take many forms: far more flexible than federalism, it is more easily adapted to the realities of countries that resort to it, and the degree of association will depend on whether cooperation is to be limited to certain fields or maximum advantage is to be taken of a broader economic community.

Modern economic associations are generally the result of cooperation between individual countries and entirely sovereign nations, which have agreed to pool some of their powers. In such cases, integration is based on the sovereignty of the partners. In our case, however, economic integration already exists and it is the sovereignty of the partners -that must be established. The point of departure is different but the aim is identical.

The Implications of Sovereignty

The idea of sovereignty is clearly defined in international law: it is, in general terms, the power to make decisions autonomously, without being subject in law to any superior or exterior power, which implies that the sovereign state has full jurisdiction over a given territory. Sovereignty ensures complete autonomy, in the sense that the state enjoys full legal freedom in all fields; its authority is exercised to the exclusion of any other within the limits of its territory; and it can be present in the community of nations.

The sovereign state may, however, of its own accord and without giving up its sovereignty, agree to limit its scope or to delegate part of it in certain specific fields.

Thus, for two states linked by an agreement or parties to an association, the joint exercise of their sovereignty would necessarily be reflected in reciprocal concessions. In the case that concerns us, any limitation that Quebec would agree to impose on the exercise of its sovereignty would entail, in return, the corresponding limitation, accepted by Canada, of its own sovereignty.

In a federal system, sovereignty is shared by two powers one of which, the central power, has priority. Consequently, citizens are ruled by two governments, two sets of laws and two court systems; there are two kinds of elections, one to elect the central parliament (the House of Commons, in Ottawa) the other to elect a local parliament (the National Assembly, in Quebec); there are also two taxation systems. On the other hand there is a single customs tariff, a single currency and a single international personality.

Under the formula proposed by the Government of Quebec, sovereignty of the State of would reside entirely in Quebec, so that Quebecers would be ruled by a single government and would pay taxes only to Quebec. Because of the association, Quebec and Canada would continue to share a single customs tariff and single currency. Each partner, however, would have its own international personality.

In legal terms, the difference between the two formulas could be stated this way: at present, the relations between Quebec and Canada are ruled by a Constitution that divides powers between two governments, only one of which, the federal government, has an international personality; in the formula proposed by the Government of Quebec, both Quebec and Canada would have an international personality, and their relations would be ruled not by a constitution, but by a treaty of association. While the present situation of Quebec in relation to Ottawa resembles that of the states of Maine or Illinois in relation to Washington, within the framework of an association it would be more like that of France or Holland in relation to the European Common Market, with certain important differences.

Any comparison, though, has its faults. The United States or the Common Market arose out of needs and situations that do not necessarily correspond to those of Quebec and Canada today, and the same can be said of all associations that have been attempted throughout the world until now. Very different political formulas and structures correspond to diverse experience, and none represents a model made to measure. Although the best known reorganization and association experiment, that of Europe, is often evoked in the present document, this does not mean that the proposal of the Quebec government is totally based on it, as though it were a prototype that could be imported here, particularly since the European experiment is far from complete.

Types of Association

The economic association of sovereign states may assume many forms, according to the combination of shared elements and total sovereignty that is selected. Sharing a certain number of elements may be carried out through legal, statutory or institutional arrangements as numerous as they are varied, so that between the state almost free of any ties and the national community almost completely eclipsed by a larger state there is an infinite number of intermediary situations and possible arrangements. It is customary to distinguish four general integration formulas, from the least restrictive to the most complete: the free trade zone, the customs union, the common market and the monetary union.

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Forms of Association

• In general, a free trade zone is defined as a geographical area composed of sovereign states within which goods can move freely. The sovereign states that constitute such zones do not have to be geographical neighbours, as is the case in the European Free Trade Association. In such cases, no customs are levied between participating countries and each decides freely on its own trade policy towards non-member countries. A free trade zone can be total, or it can include the right to resort to certain measures, administrative measures for instance, that restrict its scope in some areas. Aside from such distinctions, we can say that if Canada and Quebec opted for such a formula there would be no customs to pay on goods going from Quebec to Canada or from Canada to Quebec. On the other hand, both Quebec and Canada would remain free to establish the tariff barriers and commercial policies toward other countries which would appear desirable to them.
• The customs union is defined as the area formed by sovereign states within which customs barriers have been suppressed and which has established a single trade policy and a uniform